No. 28

Criticism of the Cartesian epoché

(10th February 1933)

<§ 1. The basic mistake of the Cartesian epoché and of modern philosophy>

Descrates’ question is that on the grounding of philosophy, the universal science as an absolutely grounded science of the being’s universe (world). This leads him to the question, whether the world given by experience implies an absolute truth. The motive of this critical question lies within the acknowledged fact, admitted by everyone that sensuousness often deceives. This motivates him to question in its being the world as such, given in a prescientific-sensuous way, to put it down as possibly, as probably non-existent.

The epoché, with regard to the world’s being, is not mere abstention from the belief in being, for example in the form that I parenthesize this belief in being, “abstain” from it in the attitude of a universal world overview, that is, the formation of a thematic total objectivation of the world, implying a thematic belief in being of the content “world”.

I rather have accepted the problematic judgment “The world possibly does not exist” in one with the epoché, since it (the prescientific world of experience we are talking about) has its acceptance of being from sensuous experience, and this may be deceiving; it has done this, as I am convinced, many times, I do not know, but it could possibly be that every experience was deceiving, that I could and would have to arrive at the conviction for each that it does this (or that I see myself in each as being inclined to disclose my certainty of being).

The epoché now has a methodical purpose in this application: How far “may I” push this doubt, how far is it “indeed” possible that something experienced was not – that world was not, that nothing of the world existed?

Here we need to explain in a clarifying way:

[406] 1) The simple reference to the known fact that sensuousness deceives, is not enough. Is this not a prejudice in the end? No will be the answer. We know that from experience. Certainly we know thus as well: Deception may be an illusion, it may also be “actuality”. Not only may being change into illusion for us. Illusion may again change into an illusion of the illusion itself.[[1]](#footnote-0) Illusion, null being signifies itself being and non-being nullity, and thus ever again.

Where we talk of “being”, there the question is indeed, where we know that from, and whether the “being” is not a mere opinion. Of course by evidence, and eventually by an immediate one. But what else does this mean than that we, instead of merely meaning, having directly and self-given, “see” it, that is, perceive it after all, which still expresses the way of consciousness of the “there-itself”, of the actually grasping, seeing it itself, to-be-oneself-at-it-itself.

That is, if something being is self-given through perception and non-being for its part is again something being, although with a modally changed sense, then “perception”, a self-giving, must exist for some non-being thing as well (and thus for every modality). Likewise thus for the possibility of being with the other possibility of non-being or the possibility of doubt, whether something is or is not. The empty opinion of possibility, the empty opinion of doubtfulness, and again of the option for doubt differs from the “perception”, from the “evident” possibility, evident doubtfulness, evidently possible nullity.

I may now have insight into the essentially universal possibility and [may] apodictically have insight into [the fact] now that every sensuous experience may become a giving of non-being of this experienced itself from a giving of the being itself in the enlargement of experience.[[2]](#footnote-1) I may say now, and not on the basis of a prejudice, but of some apodictic insight: It is certain that everything of the world sensuously experienced by me may, despite the experiential evidence [407] go over into the experiential evidence of its illusion, the non-being.

2) Accordingly, Descartes’ opinion seems even more so to be verified, and to take on the form of an apodictic evidence that the prescientific world, given through sensuousness, could be a mere illusion: If all experiential objects may be an illusion, then the allness of the same may be an illusion as well. Is this not mere tautology?

Is accordingly the Cartesian progress not quite correct? Descartes proceeds in such a way that he, by appealing to the Ego’s apodictic evidence in the known way, does not break through the general possibility of doubting all worldly things at all through the doubtlessness of the common, the human I-am, and thereby breaks through his epoché with regard to everything that could be doubted, all non-apodictic. I as a man – this was I as an object of sensuous experience, or at the experience of which sensuousness was essentially participating, as which namely I have my sensuously experienced body, as which I have sensuous imaginations with sensuous acceptance of experience and other *cogitationes* having received into them sensuous experience’s acceptance of being, as being related to sensuously experienced things. I as this everyday Ego am and remain questionable.

The apodictic Ego is only gained by a reduction, by the Cartesian epoché of the experiential contents of all sensuousness and with regard to my being of all sensuousness belonging to my empirical humanity. Descartes attempts to show that there is an apodictic core within the human Ego to be brought out by this epoché. But this was not a merely non-selfsufficient component of a psychophysical substance, having only two non-selfsufficient layers of physical and psychic characteristics, thus not something abstract in the concrete man as a concrete reality; because our body, like every sensuous thing, does not need to be, that is, there as well, where it is univocally experienced (as according to Descartes in a consequent dream); we may (and according to our supplementing explanation with apodictic evidence) always have insight as a true possibility of thinking that it and thus specifically was not our body, - whereas still the Ego, also in the case of non-being, [408] needs to exist in apodictic necessity. It has an apodictic existence, whether physical being is or is not. Therefore this nonsensual Ego cannot be a merely non-selfsufficient layer of being. It needs to be a full substance, i.e., something selfsufficient in itself, and on the other side nature as well. Thereby the dualism is grounded.

3) Why is this course of thinking, having had such a strong historical effect, fundamentally erroneous despite its seemingly imperative completeness? And why has the mistake never actually been exhibited? The basic mistake designates itself through that seeming, but not actual tautology that, since indeed every object of experience possibly does not need to be, all in one do as a matter of course not need to be.

The following was to be brought to bear especially. Every sensuous perception may evidentially experience modalization with regard to that, which it respectively represents sensuously and verifies sensuously, that is, with regard to mere bodiliness and mediately with regard to that, which is founded in this experience through this bodiliness’ certainty of being as the concretely real thing, as not merely bringing something bodily to the certainty of existence. We may consider a further course of experience from every undisputed experience, that is, simply and purely emerging in the experiential connection as accordant, in which this experience becomes questionable and takes on the character of illusionness.

But now we need to take into account that our world experience and the manifold objects of experience are not given to us in one experience respectively. As being for us they are continuously being as identical objects, presenting themselves in manifold subjective aspects persisting as the same, that is, now in the continuous change of these aspects and now in the general course of the experiencing life in separate aspects. If any experience now, being devaluated as illusory in the respective moment, for example that of perceiving, then the object’s being for me has not been abandoned thereby; I was only deceived in experiencing it now, in the real surrounding world now undisputedly accepted by me.[[3]](#footnote-2) [409] But if we judge in such a way, if we establish a connection between that, which has been posited itself as being within an experience, and the positings of being of other experiences, actual and possible ones, then our view is directed towards the general connection of the experiencing life (at first of our own, but then also of the communalized experiential life of us all), in which the experiences of the same object are embedded. It becomes clear that the being sense of the respective, now actual experiences is not isolated in its acceptance of being, but within it constantly depends on those of the other experiences.

If we make use of our insight, as far as it has thrived for now, then the whole regressive inquiry on the Ego gets another vision. Instead of talking of the world of experience in empty generalities and possibilities of the modalization within it, as which we experience in a subjective way, we need to look at this subjective world of experience, the appearing one as such in its subjective special modes, and ask what makes up the invariant thing in this Heraclitean world.

Descartes, as the whole modern era, was lacking every intentional explication of the evidence as a performance of self-presentation, in which the respectively alleged thing arrives at original self-givenness. The wrongness spreads from it through the whole modern psychology and theory of cognition, to draw a line of separation between experience as apperception (and experience is this always and necessarily) and evidence, like between basically different things. We have only that apodictic evidence under the title “evidence” in view, which we grasped in an empty-formal way as some consciousness, an absolute doubtlessness, an absolutely insurmountable necessity of thinking, was proper to, that is, without its intentional structure being explicated in the very least, as little as on the other side that of the non-evident intentions and in particular those of the (apperceiving) experiences.

[410] If Descartes had understood already the essence of intentionality, the essence of the “relation” of the *cogito* to its *cogitatum* (the “intentional object”), and thereby seized and grasped the tasks of the intentional interpretation of the alleged sense of being as such, predelineated through it, then the special problems corresponding to it would have emerged to him in sensual perception: how it was essentially built as self-presentation, but as perceiving-ad-perceiving self-presentation of a bodily being thing in its overcomplicated and changeable intentional structure. The “possibility of doubt” essential to it would become the problem of intentional interpretation of the possible modalization of sensual perceptions and sensual experiences as such from there. It would have come to his mind then that the self-presentation (original self-giving) of some spatiotemporally being thing, that is, at first with regard to bodiliness, is only possible in a systematic whole of sensuous experience, every single experience of bodily occurrences presuppositionally is embedded in.

Spoken more clearly: Something real, taken purely as an object of possible experience, is only possible in the total connection of a necessarily co-apperceived universe of realities. The real thing cannot be experienced in an isolated way, or otherwise be meant, cannot be completely experienced, isolated in a closed experience. Every experience implies, however vaguely, an attendant meaning. It is always already experienced, or rather, always already meant in the connection of the world constantly meant along (explicitly co-experienced with a core content). Accordingly the modalization of the <world>, mentally lived (in the original form of the certainty of being) in every simple sensuous perception, indeed depends on this connection of the experience’s co-acceptances.

(Of course we understand by modalization the change of its certainty of being into the modalities of doubt, the change of the being pure and simple into a mere possibility among other possibilities, possibly by preferring one of these possibilities in the special mode of probability, again the change of that, which has become dubious, into the modali-[411]ty of nullity as the “cancellation” of the previously simple existence, etc.)[[4]](#footnote-3)

The modalization of something at first given (thus conscious in the certainty of being) as purely and simply being, obviously is only possible as a break of the certainty of being by other unbroken acceptances of being. A ground of founding acceptances is presupposed (*scilicet* unmodalized); Only in the “dispute” against something simply being accepted may a simple acceptance loose its character of certain existence, which simply results in that, which has just been called simply-and-purely-being-accepted-by-us, simply-being-there-for-us.

It is always an open possibility in the constant change necessarily taking place in the total experience within the continuous course of the awake life, that a current experience looses its simple evidence, and [that] thereby an evident possibility becomes evident, that that, which is certain as being within it, is not. But everything being accepted as being, enclosed in the unity of total experience, even if implicitly, can never become evidently invalid at the same time or the possibility [can never] become evident that all in one could not be. If all that has been brought to actually apodictic evidence through complete explication, then the result is that the possibility that the universal nature in its entirety possibly is not, that the possibility of its non-being could become evident, does not at all grow together with the possibility that every sensuously experienced thing could become evident to us as an illusion in the progress of our experience.

<§ 2.> On the closer grounding of the criticism <against Descartes:>

Analysis of perception as apperception

I add for a closer explanation:[[5]](#footnote-4) Sensuous perception as an apperceiving one may perform the function of self-presentation (it makes for the perception of its objective thing) only in the tension of something properly self-presented [412] and the apperceptive horizon. As soon as one enters the explication of the acceptances of being implied in this horizon, one also sees that their verifiability is the constant presupposition for the certainty of being of that, which comes to proper perception within perception, in other words, actually presents itself. The perception is the consciousness of evidence, consciousness of the being there oneself, but within a relativity contained in it itself of something presupposed and posited thereupon. Presupposition here does not mean at all something like a hypothesis, that is, a hypothesis of something being, based on which we need to consider the posited-as-there-itself as a result, or rather, the hypothesis that that being thing could be verified by us. Rather it is an anticipation, originally motivated by the properly self-given side of the apperceived bodiliness, evidently-demanded in a certain and peculiar sense, to be able to bring to self-presentation the sides from the currently given one, which have not been self-given yet. It is, we may also say, the “induction”, originally vivid in every perception, inseparable from it, continuously changing in the course of perception into fulfilling self-presentations, whereby continuously ever new inductions are vividly awakened.

We need to add to the inductive content the content of the induced co-present of that, which belongs to the object itself in its spatial connection, and as that of the change, reaching into its future (as lasting into it) of this whole present as unchange and change. But the induction also reaches beyond this whole thing into the surrounding objective co-present, namely the objects of perception simultaneously co-existing in the necessary unity of the perceptional field, furthermore, beyond them into the accordingly co-accepted horizon of the objects being co-accepted in familiar appertinence (e.g. the unseen, but known thing of the living room, also of the antechamber, etc.), and the undetermined horizon of unknown, but as being unknown still co-accepted objects.

All these inductive contents, as building up or carrying as well their sense of being in every perception, are implied [413] certainties of being, co-functioning for the enabling of modalizations. But not only they; because if we relate this induction to co-present and future, then we now need to regard as well in a supplementing way the horizon-like contents of acceptance of the past life experience. The continuity of past fields of perception, vividly conscious in the mode of the retentional continuing acceptance and in the continuously unitary induction motivated by that, thereby functions in a quite preferred co-acceptance.

In close explication, a self-contained “inner horizon” and the corresponding outside horizon are fundamentally distinguished with regard to the object of perception (purely taken <as> the perceived one and with the sense it is accepted in in this perception). If we question the object of perception on that, which is accepted to it as the features being own essential to it, then the activity of explicating in detail, essentially belonging to every perception, results in that, which partly has already come to the fore in an intuitive way in the form of the properly perceived, partly that, which it is not yet, but could be.

Furthermore we distinguish though: First of all that, which so to say is “expressly” accepted with every step of the explicating activity, namely that, which is just being grasped, then remains grasped, on the other hand is grasped in advance, but is already affecting, and second, that, which is an undetermined-general horizon as the unknown and still completely undetermined of the object, coming forward, being grasped, etc., in the progress of perception lying within one’s ability as something determined. Every perceived thing already has this object’s sense of perception in a certain way from the starting point of perceiving – but always in implication. All own essential moments are implied in the starting point.

But this streaming change and connection of unity of implicit components of acceptance, not specialized in the implication (the being implied of which has its sense from the facultative possibility of explication) is of a kind that nothing makes sense for itself from the objective sense, neither the properly perceived “side” of the object and its distinguished special moments, [it] rather only [makes sense] from the complete function of perception [414] with all its components of acceptance. The first explication of perception and object of perception now simply shows that that, which makes this perception a perception of its own and its object simply as its own for itself, unitarily stands out and belongs together.

With regard to this object for itself, but in that sense it is a respectively meant one, we now have the distinction (in the streaming change of ongoing perception a streaming distinction) between <the> properly perceived of this object, and that, which is horizon-like meant along, and with sense-moments, through which only the object, certain of perception as being there, is a unitary object, explicable into its features and possibly perceivable as what it is, as long as it has not been perceived yet – although the still unperceived simply is “implicitly” meant as well. We call exactly this content of the perceived object, without which it could not be accepted by us as this [body], being there in sensuous perception, namely, this content of the moments belonging to the sense as well, of empty and partly determined, partly undetermined co-acceptance, the respective inner horizon. This now contrasts to the “outward horizon”, a no less essential one. The perception for itself has its correlate “object for itself” in the respective mode “objective sense”. But these are only relative concrete things. Something objective for itself is only experienceable, is only conceivable in an objective surrounding world.

The alleged object as such, the objective sense, the way it is there for us in the mode “perceived”, is, in the progress of perception, streamingly in the change, and the one determining itself ever more richly in the “there itself”, itself properly presenting ever more moments, is constituted in this change. The same is meant in every phase of progressing perception – with a horizon of indeterminacy of this same thing. That, which it is, is only possible in a field of perception, in one with simultaneous other perceptions and their objects, even if we are not directed towards them, not occupied with them primarily or else secondarily. [415] They have their inner horizons as well, or rather, they form combined unities of implicit acceptances as well, but all belong together in one unity as well, which does not form a single object though, but still a concrete multiplicity with a unitary sense of being, in which all members and their senses are combined with one another. Thus every single object has its sense of being, pointing beyond its proper essential thing towards its comrades, it and every thing of the perceptional field has its outer horizon.

But this respective perceptional multiplicity, making up the field of perception as a relative whole, is not the world according to its proper complete sense, but something within the world, that is, again pointing towards the outside again in a horizon-like way, and thereby pointing towards a possible progress of total perception, towards a possible transition of perceptional fields towards perceptional fields, in which that, which is meant in a horizonlike way as well would come to a fulfilling self-givenness with the respective changes of the sense modes of the undetermined generality and determining itself as a specialty, in which one of the respective range of open possibilities is actualized as a determined one. This points to further explications, we will not enter here.

That, which it comes down to for us here, is this: that every perception, and thus every intuitive modification of the same (e.g. as an intuitive recollection), that is, spoken in a general way, every experience on the one hand is a systematic complex in itself of elementary acceptances depending on one another. Certainly not a complex in the common sense, a combined real being apart from one another, but a system of intentional implication. On the other hand now every experience is in an overreaching systematic connection of acceptances by explicating its whole horizon, and in the way that its sense of experience is only a sense within the totality of sense givings and sense influences. This is the reason why a modalization may not be made understandable as a mere occurrence of change of the primal modality certainty of being, for example of the pure and simple being in being doubtful or non-being, at the singly perceived thing or [416] at every single perceptional multiplicity, at the single whole field of perception (for example a dream situation). Rather, every modalization and thus every negation presupposes a ground of positive, unconcerned, unmodalized acceptances, like simply every <object> “purely and simply being there for me”, that is, as this one conscious in the certainty of being, lies within a universal unity of the certainty of being prior to the modalization already, that is, has its universal ground for his own being with all the certainties of being belonging to it, - may they be devoid of any express performance in single acts.

Devaluation of the positive certainty towards doubt, towards mere presumption, towards probability or even illusion, towards nullity, is only possible in the streaming change of the total perception, necessarily going through the awake life, because the new total apperceptions, necessarily motivated in the unity of total motivation, bring such a thing to concrete acceptance, which is not compatible with the old acceptances, spoken more clearly, with those, having their ongoing acceptance in the way of the “keeping” following current certainty of being.

By associative awakenings starting from the sphere of currently experienced objectivities, and reawakening such sunken acceptances still accepted by us as being kept, or anticipating in the way of inductive awakening, contradictions may be the result: Necessarily though there is a firm ground of positivity, remaining firm during this change of consciousness, and within it already the accepted thing, with which a newly emerging acceptance comes into conflict with.

The conflict may remain unsolved in temporality, but we may not oversee that, which enables it, and that, which is disputing here properly speaking. The acceptances of horizon, motivated by the basic acceptances in the lower ground, [by] the basic acceptances implied in them, demanded so to speak, inhibit each other reciprocally. Without being inhibited, which is normally the case, each would be in its apperceptive special connection within its function performing a sense of being, certainty of being. But if for example the objective sense, having come about in such a way, gets into some motivation from the external horizon, in such a way that [417] “another object instead of the apperceived one” is demanded by the objects of the surrounding world, if a content of properly perceived things receives its intention of horizon from there, which would enter the relationship of inhibition with that, which had heretofore been motivated alone, there the doubt arises: As if, for example, in entering the dark room I “perceive”, see, a man in that corner there, who soon turns into some hanging piece of clothes by the coming about of my awakening memory of the coat stand having its place there. But this is just one of the ways disputing motivations arise on a universal ground of implicit and firm acceptances, still having their unity without any conflict, in the connection of motivation. Every conflict presupposes it.

The decision on the dispute immediately leads to a Yes and a No, to a positive acceptance, blending in, agreeing with the univocal universe of positive acceptances, whereas the counter acceptance (or in the plural the counter acceptances) receive the mode of being deleted, and thus are no longer determining for the worldly being, as something accepted in certainty, being sense, and therefore do not count any more. This also holds true in the case of the dream[[6]](#footnote-5) with regard to its whole “world of dreams”, if the Cartesian interpretation is correct. It is only thereby characterized as a null illusion that our awakening awakens those of our habitual acceptances, which enable the “world of dreams” as a being one, remaining unawakened during the dream and therefore not taking part in speaking. The falling asleep, the awakening and the still vivid and remembered dream is then implied in its nullity within the awakeness with its exposed, and freely to be opened horizons.

All in all it is the case that always a universal unity of univocal acceptance is our own when we live in an awake way, that is, lead a continuous life of perception, that is, the streaming total perception <is> embedded in this universal horizon of acceptance, and the world is certain to us as something perceived therein and horizonlike being accepted, normally in [418] unbroken univocality. But modalizations enter now and then, belonging themselves to the being world as well (the possibilities, doubts, illusions, etc.) and again the being world is predelineated horizon-like as the one ever again correcting its content as a univocal universe of being things.

New problems arise here, new questions on the being and non-being of an identical universe being in itself, now having quite another level of sense than the Cartesian problem.

<§ 3. Rejection of the dualist world interpretation through intentional explications>

It is clear that with the help of our intentional explications of the Cartesian possibility of doubting the world, the ground has been taken from under the way that Descartes gives acceptance to it far too quickly, and thereby his whole allegedly apodictic building up of a dualistic world interpretation falls.

The problems of a rational world cognition, with regard to the non-apodictic, always and essentially relative cognition of experience (or regarding the relativity of the acceptance of being of something experienced according to the being and being thus, proceeding into infinity), receive a completely new face. What use is the constancy for me, in which a universal acceptance of “the” world is restituted through ever new correction, if no worldly thing is saved from modalization? Not the certainty of the world, always making the ground for all modalization, suffers through all possibilities being open in detail that I, which is certain to me in experience and would remain univocally certain in a continuous way, afterwards needs to be abandoned by me as non-being, insofar as up till now univocality has always been achieved anew and an anticipating certainty is constantly grounded form there.

But is it not our subjective certainty, which, as something subjective, still could change? And do we not die, do we not die as humanities, may not every being subjectivity change in such a way that ever new Heraclitean Worlds [419] gain and loose certainty of being? Is it not a Herclitean river as to its content, regarding the single realities posited under the title “world”? Does cognition of the world make any sense under these conditions? How can this Heraclitean world be a ground for the cognition of something being in itself, how may there be an ontology cognizing this?

[420]

No. 29

<On the being sense of the world being in itself.

Following text no. 28>

(about the 12th February 1933)

<§ 1. How do we arrive from the modalizability of all experience to the apodictic certainty of a world being in itself?>

According to Descartes it is shown within the modalizability of every sensual certainty that every real thing, given in sensuous experience does not need to be, that we, how long ever our experience may proceed univocally, still cannot be certain in absolute doubtlessness that the experienced thing actually is. More clearly: We are certain, since we do perceive; perception is consciousness in the mode of certainty (likewise for memory). But it is not and never absolutely excluded for us that we will be able to remain at this certainty, that we will not have to abandon it. (Namely, we are not talking of the moment’s mental living of certainty. The perception passes by, but the perceived is kept. In a certain way it obviously remains accepted, the retention streaming away is, [seen] from the Ego, a having-still-accepted, and this ongoing acceptance, streaming away still-acceptance is again awakenable for us, and only in this way, in the coming back to the certain thing as still and also furthermore certain, do we have something being as something habitually accepted. But it is simply this persisting in acceptance, which is broken in the modalization.)

We subjects living along now indeed have always a universe of the remaining acceptance – in temporality; now this, now that looses its habitual acceptance, and eventually the question is: Will anything have to remain, which never looses its acceptance? But the fact is useless, where the open possibility of modalization always remains. How can we be absolutely certain of that, how may we have insight into the apodictic necessity, and may we [have it] at all, that it is not the end of the matter with this world of constant preliminarity, constant abeyance between being and non-being, this Heraclitean [421] world, being merely subjective-relative through and through, streaming in unstoppable change of acceptance, in which a being in itself, an object of absolute cognition, an unmodalizable [object], does not have any sense? How can there be thus something real in itself, and accordingly a universe of real things being in themselves, if no real thing was apodictically understandable as something being (=not modalizable), i.e., if nothing, which is self-given as something real in certainty and originally in experience, is something being eventually, but modalizable? Do we not all believe in being and truth?

We are thus at a dilemma. Is it not already part of the being sense of the world of our general and everyday world experience that it is a universe of real things, as which has a being and a being thus, which we may meet and miss in a cognizing way?[[7]](#footnote-6) The being in itself is not concerned with our subjective modalizations, we may have our insights in being and being thus, and again abandon them, we may get doubts in that, which is, negate it, etc. – If it actually is, then it is, what it is; the subjective considering-as-true and verifying itself is not the objective being true and being grounded.

The possibility and necessity of a world being in itself certainly is not grounded by the fact that every modalization of something real, certain of being and even given itself always need another real thing, equally certain, and eventually undisputed certainty of the world. The non-being of the world is inconceivable in advance, but beyond that we simply have an apriori, the apodictic certainty of the world. But now we need to ask, what is meant in this talking by “world”? Do we have another one as world in our life than the subjective-relative one, another one than that of the universe of being things, being [422] subjective-relative for us, which they are for us, in open possibility of modalization and yet in experience and through experience in verifiability?

<§ 2. Excursus.> The infinity of the experiencing anticipation

But this is fundamentally impossible. It is clear that we may not *a priori* come to an end by that, because, as we immediately say to ourselves, the being sense of the world, however it is an always meant one, implies infinity, and that in a different sense.

I perceive a thing in motion. It exits my field of perception, I perceive something else, I return to it. If I perceive the identity of the same thing, could not a similar thing steal in as the same, and if it is the same, how about the unperceived motion? Do I not again have different, nay endlessly many possibilities? Even if one of the possibilities as anticipated in naturalness be accepted from the way of motion – for example as an even period like that of the clock’s pendulum –, the other possibilities are not apodictically excluded. And if this anticipating certainty (the original “induction” belonging to all sensuous perception) now has its ways of constant verification, is it not clear that again this verification has its inductive presuppositions? Are not again possibilities, endless possibilities of many kinds of possibilities open, for example to be assigned by the words that a thing of the surrounding world comes flying here and changes the pendulum’s motion? Are we not as such referred to every occurrence having an open horizon of co-experiencing and co-experienceable other occurrences according to the sense, and this not of occurrences having been apodictically ascertained as being in themselves, but as a sense of experience, as structure of experiences themselves, not having acceptance of being in another way in the way of the combining non-selfsufficient moments of a streaming total experience, than as anticipating ones and encompassing infinities of anticipation in their anticipation? They are anticipations, [423] implying in their indeterminacy possibilities, open into infinity. But open possibilities are not nothing, but themselves anticipations.

I am standing in a constant stream of subjective meaning, subjective experience with subjectively predelineated possibilities, subjectively evident inductions, so to say making their choice among the possibilities, but in some kind of evidence. But this goes on in infinity insofar, as it is excluded *a priori* that we arrive at a unity of combined and univocal experience, which would be guarded against modalization, against the possibility of the experienced thing’s non-being in its whole proper sense of experience. All certainty of being implies some meaning beyond oneself, an anticipation, and thus we always stand in infinity.

Practically the Heraclitean river of opinions and being itself is not that bad for us, which is accepted by us in the experience and has its way of withstanding, of becoming verified, and in such a way that we may practically build on that. The Heraclitean river indeed has its infinities of possibilities. But it has a normal style, our surrounding world has its normal steadfastness, its normal modes of rest and motion, of qualitative change and unchange, the animals and men experienceable therein, like the things, their normal ways to behave, and this means in the indeed subjective way world is for us as a surrounding world of experience, experience has its normal ways of process. This implies normal ways <to> have some being thing as a recognizable one, [to have it] ever again as actual and thereby at hand for the practice, to be able to determine [it] in its characteristics and relations, and determine it in the way of a judgment for theoretical and practical purposes. But normality also means that it leaves open possible breaks; all rules have their exceptions.

Lasting being, actual being there, actual having been, actual being-at-hand in the certainty of being in modes of experience, is a rule itself, a rule of possible experience, to be performed in a self-acting way or presumably setting in on their own accord. Neither this it an absolute one, and that it may be broken under the title “disappointed expectations”, by illusions [424] and the like, is not only empirically certain, but an apriori as possibility.

Do we not have a normal world as world of possible verification in acceptance under the title “being world in the pre-scientific life of experience”, a relative actuality, which is now achieved in our naïve experiencing, now missed? But is this normality not itself a changeable one, and, as we ourselves become conscious, a changing one from humanity to humanity? How come that we assume a world, an actual world surmounting this change, and which sense of truth may this in-itself have?

We are practically standing on the ground of our normal world in the natural living along. We are living in normality, as personal subjects following our normal interests. Thus we men are in natural historicity. As soon as we aim at universal cognition of the world, have cognized already the relativity of all normality, we stand within infinity, the infinity, indeed subjective at first, of our actual and open-possible world experience and world cognition as an infinity of relativities. How do we arrive thereby at a being sense, surmounting the relativities *in infinitum*, of the same world, which is the same in every relativity and in each, only “appears” with another, relative sense, how do we arrive at the ever new transformation of being not into illusion, but into appearance? May, if the world is only for us, and even essentially world in infinite relativity, identical world in infinity in the change of relative appearances – may (this I ask) world sensefully have an in-itself in another way than an “idea”, a pole of manifold appearances, lying within infinity, whereby every normal empirical truth and normal world and its normal truths now functions as an appearance? But is this in-itself not an empty metaphysical hypothesis? It is not, if the in-itself, the world in itself has its way of self-giving.

But when could there be a world in itself for us in the certainty of being, that is, provably, which, and essentially <is> never experienceable itself in all its real things, but only in appearances, i.e. in the empirically being things in the surrounding world, in their empirical, [425] but not <as> apodictically doubtless truth? Should Descartes’ purpose for an apodictic world science still have a right, then a way of cognition as one with insight would have to be possible on the basis of the general world experience with all its occurrences of modalization, and then may be brought to light as factually to be actualized, in which this in-itself becomes apodictically certain.

It cannot be the end of the matter with a formally general evidence that in the change of the relativities necessarily an identification needs to take place under the title “identical universe presenting itself in different apprehensions”, in the transition from one to other ones (each in its kind made intuited). An identical content of the What as a being sense to be singled out intuitively must belong to the identification, and thus the question is: May the change of relativities be overlooked universally, be constructed intuitionally, and from there the universe appearing in an identical way in its structure remaining invariant, be uncovered? And may then the question on the world in itself in its individual being be asked?

(We constantly talk of something subjective here. The world is the world of our cognition, and only thereby a world, in which we live, in which we act – cognition taken in quite a wide way, by calling cognition every way of having consciousness of the world, experience in all modes as well as empty fore-meaning of the human and animal life, in which no scientific thought may have occurred yet. The world, that of our cognition, meant, experienced, thought, in all subjective modes, also those of evaluating and of practice. Does not all consideration on being and being in itself, on possibilities existing for that as for all we allocate to the world in such modes of being and which [modes] ever, presuppose us ourselves? Is world without us conceivable? Us, having world consciousness, having current consciousness and a potential one, abilities and habitualities, being inseparable from a consciousness life, and inseparable from a life in which being and something being shall be able to have sense and acceptance?

All questions on the being, all questions on the world, questions on worldly being and being thus, but also correlative questions of relative [426] cognition and cognition of things being in themselves, temporarily accepted and continuing in acceptance, are questions of subjectivity and presuppose them as subjectivity of world consciousness. Do we not have a fundamental apodicticity in that? However the situation of the in-itself of “the” world may be, may world have a passing being only subjectively sustaining for a while, we, questioning [the] being of the world, are apodictic as living in the life of world consciousness. What kind of apodictic subjectivity is this now, in which world makes sense and receives a changing sense as the world we are talking about respectively?)

<§ 3.> Critical position taking on the being in itself or non-being of the world[[8]](#footnote-7)

<Change of the Cartesian train of thoughts>

The constant conviction to be able to convince oneself by verifying all real things one is certain of, lies within the constant certainty of the world. But this in relativity. Still I keep on assuming some being thing in itself and every modalization as a correction, and presupposing as decidable through certainty, and ever again for these, by my looking at the whole life of acceptance as a course of correction.

I attempt a universal criticism of world experience. Is the certainty of the world as certainty of a world being in itself, in which I constantly am as an awake Ego, apodictic? Can it be made apodictically insightful in making distinct and clarifying its sense?

When I perform critical epoché and thereby apodictically find myself as the one performing epoché, with my experiencing the world, the world of experience as a “phenomenon”, - does this mean that I have given up the universal epoché of the world being as a universal one and have brought to apodictic acknowledging me alone as a man, that is, that I have limited the epoché to my exterior world? But may I, and even apodictically, [427] give acceptance to myself without a surrounding world, and would not, on the other hand, my proper being become questionable as soon as I let the exterior world be accepted as possibly not being, and question it in this sense? The possibility of thinking my non-being exists without a doubt: since I am mortal. Therefore there cannot be any speaking of exhibiting my being as apodictic. But how do I convince myself of the true possibility of thinking my non-being? It only consists of truth, if I do not only posit it verbally, but intuitionally realize it as a possibility actually, i.e., when I presentiate a possible experience in fantasy and in a completely concrete way (following the principle of self-giving). How to I construct the possibility of thinking my non-being? I experience the death of the other ones, and it presupposes the being of the other ones in the connection of the world. And does not the objectivation of my death presuppose such things and even as a first thing the objectivation of living and dying of other animal beings? Obviously we are always talking about me as a man here, I cannot think of me as well as of other single realities there, except within a world.

Thus I may perform a universal epoché, but as soon as I bring myself, this human person, to acknowledgment, I not only have limited the epoché, but given up completely. World is not positable in parts, every single positing in all modalities, also every question, every hypothetic positing, every single epoché only rests on the ground of the certainty of the world. The certainty of the world is thus determined that it remains certainty of the world, whereas not everything of that at all, which I respectively count among the being world as some single being thing, needs to be actual, nay, properly speaking, nothing of that is free from the possibility of doubt.

But I now try to show that exactly the universal epoché still may remain, while I say “my *ego cogito*”[[9]](#footnote-8), or, which is combined with that: Starting from Descartes [428] I may change his train of thoughts by improving it, namely in such a way:[[10]](#footnote-9)

The general possibility of non-being of every real thing I (and anyone else) experience, does not result in the possibility of non-being of the world experienced by my (by us), but constantly presupposes the being of the world – or rather: The universal evidence of the modalizability of every real thing given to me in the evidence of experience is not equivalent to the evidence of modalizability of the world’s being (that is, of the modalizability of all experienced and experienceable realities in one). The possibility of modalization, especially of the non-being of a being thing (as worldly, we say: really being) is apodictic. This apodicticity presupposes the universal world experience in the performance of its certainty of being, that is, as not posited in epoché, neither problematically posited as modalizable. Nothing has happened by that to bring to evidence this problematically posited possibility as a possibility.

But we see that we need to be more precise. However, the naïve certainty of being, the experiencing one or anticipating in an empty way, implies the verifiability: the “One may eventually convince oneself completely through experience and continuing the experience that that, which is supposed to be certain, is true and actual.” But the certainty of being within the general world experience is not therefore absolute certainty of true being. Every certainty of being has possibilities of modalization, whereas other certainties of being give support as uninvolved ones.

Verification and the “true” belong to the modalities: But the “true” as well is modalizable into “not true”, “false”. Must there be an “absolutely true”, a not modalizable “finally true” for a supposed real thing, and correlatively a “being once and for all and for everyone”, an absolute being? And thus in totality: Must there be a world being in absolute truth, one being in itself, which implies that it would be in itself as a universe of [429] single realities being in themselves? Is the constant correction in the general experience, the constant reproduction of a general certainty of being by overcoming the certainty’s modalities a verification for the being of a world in itself ?

The world is the one accepted by us, being for us, experienced in our experience, considered in our consideration, evaluated and dealt with in our evaluating and acting, - another world than this one, we are talking about, and may talk about respectively, is senseless. Thus every truth we allocate to it then is the one meant by us, verified by us, into which we have insight supposedly or actually. When we find ourselves as men in the world, then it is us who find, [it is] us, who, by practicing world experience, find our human being in the experienced world. World is what it is, a supposed one, and, in which sense ever, a true one and the one being accepted by us in which modes ever according to everything it is “supposedly” or “actually” in single realities; it has us ourselves as correlates thus, its sense of being is not otherwise conceivable than as a correlate sense, <it is> the one being accepted by us as Ego-subjects in each and everything. Some being thing of every conceivable sense is accepted by us, currently or potentially, as something supposed or to be supposed, as truly and actually being, to be verified by us in such a mode. We belong to all supposed things as performing meaning acts, to the potential We as subjects of ability, and thus we are always in advance possibly available, recognizably identifiable as something acquired, in lasting acceptance and continued acceptance for us, and thereby with everything belonging to it of grasping and being able to grasp, of keeping and being able to representiate, of an acquiring getting to know and acquired habitual cognition – as long as no modalization comes up, etc.

Does not actuality and possibility of the world thus apodictically presuppose us ourselves as the subjects cognizing in the widest sense of the word, is it not constantly our cognitional acquisition with all its sense it has for us, and may ever have?

[430]

*<Later addition>*

But the decisive thing is still missing. It does not suffice to talk of modalizability of every apperceived real thing and in detail of correction as itself again modalizable, of the constancy of relative being and relative truth. It needs to be fundamentally considered that the universal course of the experiencing world life is a universal course of correction.

This title “correction” is equivalent to the title “constitution of the respective surrounding world”. Surrounding world already derives from correction, and as an accepted one predelineating future correctability and being corrected. This is repeated in the change of the surrounding worlds as constituting a further surrounding world. There the task is to explore in its essential structure subjective life as an awake life and world as an accepted one, as a field of being and life’s field of action, and to understand as apodictic the being of the world as [being] in the course of infinite correction, or to understand the course of universal relativity as the rise of perfection of the experiential cognition and cognition, [a course] in which being world predelineates and verifies an identity of the in-itself in the course of perfection. The in-itself <is> the pole eventually predelineated in the infinity of this course of perfection, which only makes sense as a pole of this infinite course. This is the naïve in-itself – as the pole of pre-scientific world life.

The science, “constructing” infinities, creates a new idea, the ontological form idea of the “world in itself” as a form of every possible world, as of the universal in-itself, to which the surrounding world of relativity moves in its streaming, but only horizonlike anticipated course of change as ever more perfect description. The world of relative experience is actuality in an infinity of possibilities. But all these possibilities and their different poles are ordered by the ontological form, controlling it *a priori*. Scientific world cognition, the exact one, is consciously going away from the idea of approximation under the guidance of ontology.

But new problems from there.

[431]

No. 30

<The double sense of epoché>

(possibly beginning of March 1933)

<§ 1.> The epoché with regard to all “tradition”

<Psychophysical self-experience is apodictically included in every experiencing the world>

We are naively standing in the world and ask, which [thing] of the world, the being accepted by us as such, we owe to tradition through other ones, and which we take and have taken purely and directly from experience. What is tradition there? Critical examination of tradition in the common sense; attempt to singly overcome the prejudices, and to examine everything of the immediate experience.

The world is and remains presupposed; it is experienced indeed. But experience is sensuous and known to be deceiving. This means, it is still presupposed that I could correct my supposed world experience, that sensuous experience has its original right, that empty opinion is measured by experience and experience by experience, which easily could still be interpreted more closely. I have a relative cognition of that, which is, in the course of experience developing and correcting itself. But I am certain in doing so that something is actual respectively, however incompletely, correctly in part, in what misguided way ever I grasp it; this is a matter of course. I here have all acceptances of the object exterior of me in the tension between being and illusion now, that is, for the being thus as well as for being pure and simple. I may never say for a certain substrate object, finally, that it is actual and determined thus, I need to leave open the possibility of deceptions.

And this is the advantage of my Ego. Everything external to me, accepted in the certainty of being, presupposes me as being. First of all in the possibility of perception: seeing, hearing, etc.; perception of a non-Ego is impossible without self-perception. We are not in the world like other things, as if our existence could be an illusion as well as a being, and also as if we [432] could fail in any worldly experience, like the being experienced of A does not necessitate that the B is being experienced, which is now experienced together with A. Rather, wherever something external to the world is experienced, I am experienced as well, and may the worldly experienced [thing] be an illusion (the experienced [thing] thus something to be deleted afterwards), it necessarily belongs to my human being as its psychic thing, my psychophysical thing, as my bodily-mental seeing, etc, that is, for me myself: I am necessary, insofar as I experience at all, there and there as experienced and as that, whichever I experience, as experiencing. My being is apodictically determined as a self-experienced one in every world experiencing.

Non-being of something worldly, of single real things, belongs itself to the content of proceeding world experience, and as long as it is experience, it is certainty of being of the world as a universe of an actually being thing. Non-being of something external to the world is only possible in the frame of the general world experience in such a way that something experienced as being on the basis of such a thing, is in a sustaining acceptance of certainty, be it as currently experienced, or it is as being accepted in such a way from former experience (although not actually experienced now). But world is experienced in the course of experience in such a way that thereby, as long as it is experience – and it is always current experience, as long as I am awake -, necessarily is experienced as my own human existence, in psychophysical concretion.

Thus, whatever I experience, how, with which current content of experience world is there for me in the certainty of being, my bodily being there as well is necessary – necessary insofar as I may only have world in original givenness in the form of the “bodily” givenness, and this shall designate here, in the sensuous givenness as seen with my eyes or as touched with my fingers, etc., on top of that as visible with regard to that, which has not been seen yet, as touchable when I only see it, but am not touching it yet, etc. This bodily being-with as well as bodily perceiving is a two-sided being-with, being-with as a physical body, which is a body though as some bodiliness, in the motions of which I move, in the emotions of which I feel, in the sensation of emotion of which, in the pains and lusts of which I am there in a feeling [433] way, in short, in the bodily existence and occurrence of which I am as an Ego subject, a managing, acting and suffering one, active and affected, and of which I am inseparable as a real one: concrete Ego as a bodily acting and suffering one, concrete body as a body, “in which” I am. My psychophysical, my human being as being-in-the-world and being-in-it belongs to all worldly being, the world being for me respectively, which has been and will be for me respectively, in this all-temporality, and if only by thinking and being able to think in an indirect way, then necessarily motivated from the actually perceived and perceptible and grounded or to be grounded from it.

When I now say, and need to say, some external real thing (something outside of the world) does not need to be although it is experienced, although it is even directly seen as itself, and verifying itself in proceeded seeing on a stretch of many-sided further experience; Experience, contrary to that, is impossible as such, without my being myself and being experienced – in contrast to all other experienced things I am in an apodictic way certainly being – in apodictic certainty, with regard to my acceptance of being undeletable, unmodalizable, undoubtful for me, - if I say thus, then it is quite correct, but it needs to be understood.

As long as I live in an experiencing way, as long as I have current world thus in the certainty of being and in the form of a thereby necessary core of most original perception, in the further course a memorial one through possible recollection with accessible past – and thereby some future, “in advance” accepted by me in certainty -, for so long am I apodictically doubtless for me, or, which is equal to that, for so long is it inconceivable for me that my non-being, that my being-for-me could emerge as an illusion. Spoken in contrast to that it is part of the experiential acceptance of every other real thing that it may be doubted and negated, or rather might become.

Accordingly I may perform some critical attitude with regard to the being of every real thing external to me. I may ask, how far my certainty of being reaches, how far it is justified, and also generally, which best possible ways of grounding [434] are conceivable and performable, especially whether such a thing as a final, that is, apodictic grounding of being, may be sensefully attempted, if not through experience, then through a thinking utilizing through experience, etc. Since every external real thing of experience is hovering between being and illusion, this question of grounding the being becomes important, and it already emerges ever again within the practice of life. In contrast to that it does not make any sense in advance to raise such questions for my own human existence. Mind you, this is the question on being and not being thus. Spoken in a more clearly way: The world is given as a universe of realities in the experience constantly streaming away, belonging to my awake life.

This implies: Everything, which has initially and in the most original way of bodily present been there for me, eventually is something substantially being, eventually a substrate of characteristics, of relations, etc. in a much ambiguous way; the world is a world of “concrete” real things in the end, in which characteristics, relations, parts only have a non-selfsufficient, abstract being. I as a concrete man am among the concrete “things” of the world, among the concrete substances. The concrete question on being relates to the being of the concrete [things], the substances. The question, unclearly delineated by the “being thus”, is the question on the non-selfsufficient derivations of being, the being things, encompassing it in their own sense that they may not be concrete, not for themselves, but only are as pieces of some substances’ determination. Characteristics eventually are only conceivable as characteristics (inner “features”) of substances, etc. That difference of modalization (with regard to the being for me), now exists with regard to the concrete things, but not with regard to their derivations’ acceptance of being; because I may well be wrong with regard to my subjective being. But certainly not with regard to all my moments of being thus in a similar way.

But we do not need to go into closer examination; because it is the most essential thing for us to count the kind of this concretely human apodicticity as being basically essential for the general world experience. As long as I am in its natural performance, I am able to make certain my Ego’s apodictical uncancellableness.

[435]

<§ 2.> The double sense of epoché>

What now, if I change this natural performance with the help of a universal epoché? I cannot volitionally modalize the certainty of being of my respective current experience with its respective field of experience. But I may, instead of being devoted to the experienced in the certainty of experience, directed towards its being and its being thus in following it, whether in order to get to know it, or to cognize it in theoretical purpose, whether in order to deal with it according to an acting purpose, planning the being’s change, or to initially evaluate its being different as a possibility, probably as a practical possibility for me, and to consider it practically in the choice: I may, instead of all that, rise as a disinterested spectator above the world’s certainty of being, and above such natural living along.

To naturally live along, having a natural attitude: to “have” world as a universe of being realities, to simply find these in their open connection, in their open horizonness, incrementally being disclosed, and changing in the mode of givenness, acquiring modalizations of the being as well in the course of this having current and acquiring a new determined having a being, doubtfulness, disjunction between being and non-being or non-being pure and simple instead of the heretofore simple being there, furthermore changes of the character of the world’s acceptance with regard to the respective way of world givenness (the fields of perception and memory, in which world presents itself as being): elimination of the modalities under replacement through unmodalized being of a new objective sense, eliminations in the form of changing the non-being A into a B being instead, in its place = correction.

The inhibiting, the practicing epoché, abstention from the natural performance of being within the world experience performed in the natural way and remaining in performance; in order to test the sustaining of the certainty of being, whether I may always remain at that, to ever again be able to restitute the certainty of being, whether my having a being is such a one, which in future [436] does not need to be abandoned. A goal arising within the empirical is guiding here, that of a lasting and not only transitionally persisting being, as such a one, which may ever again be verified. This ever-again, this way of being final, is not a logical idea but a concrete type of an open “I may ever again, and will ever again be able”.

The inhibiting of the natural certainty of being of single objects, being currently experienced or currently coming into consciousness – while others remain in acceptance. The remaining-accepted of the old-acquired having a being, winning acceptance as being without further ado in the recollection within the clear or empty coming-back-to-that, the constancy of the awake foreground and the not awake, sedimented background. On top of that: the undetermined horizon of present and time modal horizon as such, the horizon of unacquaintedness as an unknown there-as-well, having-been-there-as-well, etc. The way of the acceptance of being of a single real thing, or rather, of the contentual sense of being, the “objective sense” of each differed <into>: 1) its own-essentialness, 2) the exterior of its own-essentialness, the determinations of the connection, the real connections, relationships, only giving concretion in the full sense to the proper essential

The epoché may therefore have a double sense. The single thing in its respective mode of determinacy of experience and another opinion is what it is, in its concrete connection, but it is within it necessarily with a persisting own-essential content, it is a real substrate of characteristics (inner features). What does questioning the single thing mean? According to its being? In contrast to its being thus, its inner and outer features? The thing does not exist, it is nothing at its spatio-temporal point; this is always, it is not suspended through the thing’s non-being. To always keep world accepted, i.e., to have spatio-temporal world, universe of being, in the preceding form of the spatio-temporality’s being as such. This is the original form further forms are related to, the ont<ological> form of the real world as a whole, in which this verifies its unity and wholeness and [in which] every single real thing has its special form of wholeness, but in a non-selfsufficient way, [437] insofar as it is entangled into an integral connection. To experience a thing – the universal form of the world is the horizon, in which the thing is, its being is being-in-the-world, it is, what it is, only in this taking-part in the whole of the world; the being of the world is earlier than that of the thing.

I already have a world, when I ask for being and non-being of the thing. To ask, whether this thing exists in the world, is to ask, whether this thing exists in the world being for me (or for us) with a concrete determined-undetermined sense of being. “This thing”, it is this, supposed as that being at its [place], a spatio-temporal place being respectively determined, possibly appearing with an experiential content, but questioned.

To question a single feature of a thing, to avoid its having-accepted, is to maintain acceptance of the thing, and this implies: not without this feature, but in the indeterminacy, whether this or another, and which. The acceptance of the thing is in advance in its ontological form, but in any subjective mode of being experienced and fullness of experience with an objective sense only constituting itself in the course of experience and being ever more full. It is thus still open, how the thing is – how it is in its form, predelineated in advance.

As soon as I experience something, I already experience a horizon in the acceptance of certainty, never to be broken, stationary spatiotemporal and ont<ic> as such. And it is the horizon of actual being, a horizon of univocal experienceability, of a univocality to be the result of correction through which modalizations and corrections ever. Every avoidance relates to the respective accepted in a subjectively modal way, as that always directed towards legitimation.

There is thus only the suppression of subjective certainties in the natural experience, whether this or that single real thing or a real determination in the world being accepted in advance, and being accepted in some unbroken objective sense is actually thus, is actually in this connection of being, accepted in advance, is appropriate in its open form, predelineated in a horizonlike way, with all other already accepted or in future experienceable [things]. [438] I may inquire everything taken into view in this regard, and I may inhibit its relative acceptance of being.

Each – but this does not mean all in one, this does not mean the world as world of streaming experience, the now actual experience, and the habitually not yet abandoned experience, still having its effect as a heritage, it does not mean to put out of the action my whole acquired having a world, and the horizon of some being future, predelineated from it. To inhibit single things never means to inhibit the single thing in its whole concretion, i.e., with all its real determinations of connection. Thus the “nothing” of an illusion is indeed a being cancelled of all specifically real determinations of the supposed real thing, namely of all those, by which the remaining spatiotemporal shape, a section of the universal spatiotemporality, is concretely filled in the form “persisting real thing”. But the empty spatiotemporal shape is not nothing, but a piece of the being spatiotemporality, whose acceptance of being is and remains presupposed.

If the single thing in its complete concretion was subjected to the epoché, then this means epoché with regard to the world and its persisting ont<ic> form, among that the most fundamental one of spatiotemporality. But the sense of this concretion is distant, as long as we live in the natural attitude. The thought that the earnest thought of the non-being of some (worldly) being [thing], in one, the totality of the being, would destroy the world, lies far apart. And likewise with regard to the epoché. It is also clear accordingly that a proceeding epoché with regard to the single real thing may never lead to the epoché of world, and not perhaps in the systematic shape of an epoché with regard to all single real things except for me, and afterwards of an epoché with regard to myself as a real man.

But we also need to pay attention to the following here. I shall practice epoché with regard to any exterior real thing or else with regard to my human existence. I want to keep unaccepted that, which is actually accepted by me as real here or there: of course in the being sense it has for me, as this table, as this man over there, as I myself here and now. But to this being sense also belongs everything I have brought to bear within the co-experiencing, co-thinking, through taking over such traditions [439], have taken over into my acceptance of being. We all belong to this world, I belong [to it] as experiencing the others, determined and indeterminately unknown others, who for their part have again their horizon of others. My We belongs to the world and we <belong> as experiencing world, cognizing world, treating world and thereby effecting new, changed contents of the world, subjects contained in the We, who again experience their We, and take it over from them, and I myself as acquiring such a mediate thing, etc.

The ont<ic> sense of the world is for me and then for everyone having an existence for me, correlate of a subjective acceptance, a unity of acceptance related back to my and our subjectivity (with the sense of the indicated mediacies). The being accepted not only by me (and all the time), but by everyone and any time is encompassed in subjective regard in everything being accepted by me. To subject an acceptance-of-a-thing to the epoché is not only to parenthesize my acceptance, but the whole horizon of my known or unknown other ones and thereby of all subjects of the world – as subjects of the world functioning for the objective being through their communicating experiencing and meaning. To “suspend” me thereby means to suspend all subjects as constituting ones for this object in actual or possible experience, etc.

There is thus no separate suspending in any systematics, in which the universal acceptance of the world could be emptied out, exploited incrementally, even if proceeding into infinity, and to thus arrive at a total epoché, as little as one could design the thought of the world’s non-being as a possible one by thinking the world cancelled, one real thing after the other *in infinitum*, and in being supposed to thereby change the world’s total being into total non-being by emptying out the being.

The world apperception performed in the mode of certainty of being (belief in the world): The universal horizon of co-acceptance is implied in the course of natural life in all single acts in such a way that everything being conscious is expressly conscious as being therein, even if non-expressly, as being in the world. The certainty of the world thus is constantly implied, even if it does not emerge in a special act as the world’s positing of being.

[440] But I can also expressly direct myself to this being, and this means then, while I had just been singly directed to this and that, I already had in co-acceptance the world, streamingly constituting itself in my streaming life, constituting itself in the form of ever new syntheses of acts and act horizons, endlessly proceeding ones, continuously and never stopping, going through all awake periods in taking them up. And now I change this living unity of life from that, which had currently been given in the momentary present, into the shape of one thematizing its synthetic unity of acceptance. The inexpress consciousness of the world’s existence becomes the express one, the world [becomes] an intentional This.

But now it is not the case that I, living in the naturalness of the horizon’s acceptances, simply would have in a way to be differentiated without further ado: streamingly-unitary world apperception, mode of the world belief, and as conscious therein, and as there in the acceptance of certainty: world.

The world consciousness I have in the certainty of being, is itself a worldly existing one. Its horizonness implies it itself. The one world apperception, given in the naturalness in the mode certainty of being, has a horizon itself and a world apperceptive horizon, the thematizing directing-oneself towards world in its anonymity anyway belongs to, and if world and consciousness of world has not yet become thematic, then the faculty of being able to still is implied in the horizon, and thus we are standing as such within an iterative infinity of the possible implication, the infinity of the constantly given world, presenting itself with an ever again new content, and in ever again new subjective ways of appearance, in its constant existence for me, an infinity of world apperceptions, classifying themselves ever again into the infinity of the world itself as themselves worldly apperceptible contents and already implicitly decided in the world horizon in advance.

[441]

Appendix XXIV:

Epoché with regard to all traditions <as epoché of all prejudices. On the concept and reach of tradition>

(about 1930)

*Tradition. Epoché of all tradition in the problem of philosophy’s beginning*

The purpose of philosophy. A professional purpose like other ones? Shoemaker and philosopher. The boot and philosophy in history. Change of the historically traditional purposes, their differentiation, their enrichment within a generality. What is the general thing of philosophy in the historical shapes? I may only ask for the general thing in de facto general and special acceptance from the vividly actual purpose. What do I want, the philosopher, taken generally, what was always meant in this kind of purpose? Universal cognition anyway, sustaining, save against error, save through a grounding with insight, ever again to be performed. But the difference: the one’s boot is not that of the other one, but philosophy is just one, if it is at all.

Philosophy as universal, finally grounded cognition, intersubjective, common good, and positive sciences. Only branches of philosophy.

Philosophy, science and prejudice. Prejudice as ungrounded judgment. Universal and special epoché with regard to all prejudices.

How far does “prejudice” reach? The prescientific life <is> full of prejudices. It judges as well. But what does judgment mean there? Predication? Statement, sentence accepted by me? The closer consideration of historicity or traditionality of the human existence, which only on a linguistic layer speaks up for the single one and in the community of communication. The concrete life in its expressness, and this means <that> the expressing-itself is not the expression, and is also inexpress life prior to the expressing. Human life in the awakeness as a being conscious of itself (the I-live), and as mentally living within itself, concrete stream of experiencing in itself, but in quite an extended sense.

This life in its proper traditionality – again in a widest sense -, it implies the transmitted, and implies its transmitting. It is called as that the life of consciousness. The streaming life as living present is life from its past. But it implies this past as a tradition, occasionally as having become patent, open [442], latent as a whole, self-contained. But the man living awakely may freely remember, or rather, uncover in inquiring back after that, which has been, make it patent, which is latently implied in it.

Life may be “questioned” on that, which it “implies”, which is not actually there, which neither has been there as actually “remembered”, and this question is “answered” as a fulfillment of the asking purpose through actualization of the respective memory. We do not mean an express, speaking inquiry by this questioning, but simply this being able to have a purpose, and a purpose for that, which is implied in present as the one, which has become from the trait of its being past (lying within it). Likewise for the future as the “intentionally” implied thing within the streaming life of present, namely of a life not being there yet, but towards which it lives, and which may in advance “be questioned” in “pre-memory”, becoming patent as something previewed in a relatively determined way, or with regard to its indeterminacy as a pre-conscious, anticipated range of possibilities, possible future present.

Every single human one lives as an Ego within its I-live – and at first it is mentally living therein in that sense, as something awake it has certainty of being of existing things’ content in this life, something existing in the world and being originally there as worldly present in the time modalities now, now being there in the mode remembered, now past for me as some past worldly thing and world, and thus with regard to the future. I have world experience in my life – world experienced in my experiencing life, as in which I experience world and not my life.

*World from tradition in the closer and wider sense*

1. Tradition from communication, linguistically-express and having come to habitual conviction through a takeover, taken over into proper personality and determining its act life. Tradition is an acceptance having been taken over, normally certainty, but also doubts may be taken over. Extension of the concept “tradition”. Proper experience and knowledge gained from experience. Memory as tradition. The life transmittingin a vivid way forwardly as well.
2. But not only that. Every worldly experience as ad-perception. With the proper perception, in which something presents itself as there itself, co-opinion, which could only be legitimated through future perception. Something meant along, which is already accepted in advance, prior to the expressness, nay, even prior to the paying attention to, prior to the explicit meaning, something meant along, which only through explicit meaning for oneself [443] becomes a proper meaning. I do not have a thing without that. Thus for the whole world as a world of experience. Hidden tradition.

The being of every worldly thing and thus of all worldly unions, entanglements, and eventually of the respective whole world, the one always accepted by me in respective experience (inner and outer horizons), is a “prejudice”, the world a “prejudice”.

Scientific, universal cognition – grounded cognition, not accepting any prejudice but the way it is accepted by me, us principally, rather questioning each on its right, i.e., demanding its grounding for each. What is that, grounding?

Experience in itself results in cognition, if it becomes activity in the horizon of passive pregivenness. It is a cognizing and as that explication in the double sense, explication, in which the explicated is characterized as really lying as itself within the perceived (being accepted as well as imperceived), and for the second the explicit may be characterized as <the> apperceived in concrete apperception, as being there itself towards the properly non-perceived, actualization of the ad-perceived, fulfillment of the meaning, meaning beyond the properly perceived. Again in other words:

The other sides meant along according to the sense show themselves in new perceptions (as cores of new apperceptive perceptions), and by doing this, pure (in the best case) fulfilling enters in parts, showing no more than, which had already been anticipated in advance, that is, which is already completely known, or foreign determination (not thus or not quite thus, but rather thus), or rather, closer determination. The attendant meaning, having the mode of the expecting pre-meaning in the process-like course of perception, is in general though of the mode of “general indeterminacy”, which, questioned, develops in a range of disjunctive possibilities, and the fulfillment then leads to closer determination through actualizing one of them. The original apperception is continued in this course of continuous transition from apperception to apperception as a changing one; but showing itself in the attunement of its self-giving meaning in the meant as ever more complete, determined, justified, it presents a whole of perception, a single streamingly changing perception of something perceived.

This renews itself in a modified way within recollection, and in the synthesis with that, which has been perceived at the same time, closer determining its horizon of past, and the unity of the respective total perception, with all being meant along in a horizonlike way, eventually is a unity of univocality, an experience, in which world is continuously the [444] experienced [thing]. A break in univocality though may happen in detail; the perception does not lead to fulfillment in the progress, but “disappointment”, the preliminary acceptance lying within preliminary meaning, is “destroyed”. A cancellation comes up, and thereby the whole process, having been that of a unitary acceptance of being of the meant content (sense content) up till now, experiences a cancellation. The perceived receives the revaluation of nullness, the simple being becomes the cancelled one, the non-being. It is not and has not been (with regard to that, which has just now been as having just now been in certainty). But the world has not been suspended for us, etc.

The universal experience as world experience is the ground of acceptance constantly going through all awake life, and it is the one always already accepted in advance without any questions, when science sets its task and its special questions in its frame. All natural questions are directed towards the experienced world, always being accepted in the stream of experience and streamingly perceived-ad-perceived in the way of apperception.

Science creates, or, spoken in a personal way, the scientist creates products in his scientific thinking under the title “theory”, and all implied therein, the concepts, sentences, results, groundings of all kinds, but products presupposing world experience as a universal ground, and world experienced therein, as what and how it is experienced respectively. The respectively experienced as such in its How and its corresponding ont<ic> horizons is the material of scientific work – material streamingly changing, material in constant stream.

This or that real thing is constituted for the experiencing subject in the synthesis of this stream, which is synthesis of acceptance, synthesis of meaning, as an identical, supposed thing, but in an ever new How, in ever new sides, in ever new determinacies and yet again indeterminacies, and this is the theme of the scientifically questioning, answering subject, the shaping itself as a judgment and content of judgment, and the shaping itself in the verifying grounding towards the proved truth: true judgment on this or that thing, true proof for the series of a truly objective content from immediate true contents, true theory with regard to a generally thought objective connection, etc. That is, world for me, for us <is> a universal tradition and foundation of all tradition.

But here the problems: How does the performance of science understand itself, the theoretical truths, classifying themselves into the world itself though, acting performance on the ground of world experience with all [445] meanings of horizon implied in it, and how does the ability of streaming world experience to give down-to-earthness to science understand itself? How does the acceptance of being of the general experience understand, ground itself? Epoché, which is demanded in the universal self-examination towards some possible world cognition as world science thus reaches so far.

1. But where do we know <this> from? [↑](#footnote-ref-0)
2. Experience is supposed to mean immediate perception here, possibly the total perception of a perceptional field. It may be a dream, all the things of the field and even my bodily existence in the field as a dreamed Ego may be an illusion. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
3. On the margin of this paragraph a waved line by pencil, marginal remark on that: „To be created in a better way.“ Editor’s not. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
4. To put this in advance. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
5. Undertaking of an analysis of perception according to the implications in the sense of perception from here. Usable as a whole, but now to be done correctly; because it may not remain at that. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
6. But this is made far too easy! [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
7. Is not an order of being in itself part of the being world as a spatiotemporal one in such a way that it is decided for every part of the same in itself, whether and what it implies? Do we thus not have to say, something being and truth as the goal of experience and cognition is absolutely certain, apodictically certain? [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
8. 12th November <19>33. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
9. Whereby the Ego of course takes on a transcendental sense. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
10. The transition towards the transcendental Ego is not made on these sheets, but the Cartesian way is made subject to criticism, a repetition in intentional deepening. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)